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Abstract. RIES stands for Rijnland Internet Election System. It is an online voting system
that was developed by one of the Dutch local authorities on water management. The system
has been used twice in the fall of 2004 for in total approximately two million potential voters.
In this paper we describe how this system works. Furthermore we do not only describe how
the outcome of the elections can be verified but also how it has been verified by us. To
conclude the paper we describe some possible points for improvement.
1 Introduction
RIES, the Rijnland Internet Election System, was developed by the ‘Hoogheemraadschap van
Rijnland’, one of the Dutch local authorities on water management. In the rest of this paper
we will refer to this authority by ‘Rijnland’. The Netherlands is divided in approximately 35
‘waterschappen’. These are local authorities responsible for almost anything that has to do with
water in their region: the quality of the water, the quantity of the water, the quality of the dikes
and so on. In the Netherlands this is a serious matter.
These authorities have their own elections with typically between a half and one million po-
tential voters. As a local authority these elections do not have to follow the Dutch ‘kieswet’, the
national law of how elections should be arranged in the Netherlands. They are free to use their
own system as long as their board has approved it. In order to increase the number of people
actually casting their vote and simultaneously to decrease the cost of such an election, Rijnland
decided to invest in setting up an internet election system, even though in general it is absolutely
not clear whether this can be done securely. See for instance [3] in which a very critical view to-
wards internet voting is presented and the advise is given not to use this technology at all because
of inherent vulnerabilities. Rijnland’s previous election in 1999 was an election by ordinary mail.
The overall turnout was in the order of 22%. Unfortunately for Rijnland, the turnout in 2004 was
decreased to 17% of which 33% has voted by the internet. This amounts to 70.000 online votes,
making it one of the largest internet elections. There are no figures available yet on the turnout for
the second time RIES was used: the elections for the water management authority ‘De Dommel.’
Since it is not relevant for this paper, we will not address whether the new system was a success
or not, from this perspective. We will only address technical matters.
Rijnland started their development by asking a third party to check the security risks involved
with setting up an internet voting system. The Dutch company TNO carried out this preparatory
research and came to the following conclusions:
– Many risks involved in voting by internet are not higher than in voting by ordinary mail.
– There are some risks typical to internet settings like DDOS attacks and Trojan horses on
client machines. However, there exist procedural counter measures for the specific situation of
internet voting.
– None of the currently available systems can be applied to Rijnland’s election.
See [6] for the complete report.
Based upon this TNO report, Rijnland decided to develop and build its own system. It set
up a project team which included one of the co-authors of the TNO report, Piet Maclaine Pont.
Based upon the ideas from the master’s thesis ([4]) of one of his former students Herman Robers,
he designed the RIES system. In order to get some return value for their investment Rijnland and
Maclaine Pont have applied for patents on the system. In Section 2 we describe in detail both
Robers’s system and RIES. At this stage we only describe the distinguishing feature of RIES:
its transparency. Before the elections take place all potential outcomes are published. Via clever
but elementary use of hashes and secret encryptions each voter can actually check afterwards
if his vote has contributed appropriately to the final outcome. See for instance [1] and [5] for
cryptographically more advanced systems.
Several independent parties have looked at the RIES system before it was actually used during
the elections. This is where the current authors enter the picture, since they were involved in this
evaluation. During a public workshop before the elections most of these parties presented their
findings.
As independent outsiders the authors have evaluated the RIES system before use, and have
critically followed its deployment, including third party counting of the electronic votes. This
has led to a national publication [2]. The current paper presents the not widely known RIES
system—together with our findings—to an international audience.
2 The systems
Before we flood the reader with many details on the two related systems, we first want to emphasize
the main idea. Essential in both systems is that before the elections already a pre-election reference
table is published which contains all possible valid votes represented by key-less hashes together
with a mapping to the corresponding candidates. During the election the legitimate voters build
up a post-election table with their votes represented by hashes using their personal secret key. The
outcome of the election is calculated by computing key-less hashes of each vote in the post-election
table. If the vote is valid, its hash value can be found in the pre-election table and the chosen
candidate can be determined. And since this hash is a key-less hash anyone can compute it, hence
anyone can check the result of the elections.
2.1 Robers’s system
The system described by Robers in his thesis [4] was developed for a local election at the Delft
University of Technology in the Netherlands. Key assumption here was that all participants own
a multi-function smartcard. This smartcard is trusted and takes care of performing the critical
operations.
Robers describes three separate entities. In his thesis he uses a quite technical explanation of
these entities. Here we opt for a more intuitive description.
Voter. A person who is allowed to vote in the election. He uses his smartcard to authenticate
himself to the election system and to perform the necessary computations.
Authority. This is the party initiating the election. It calculates a secret key for each voter and
distributes this key in advance onto each voter’s smartcard. It uses specific crypto-hardware.
Anonymizer. This is a party somewhat inbetween the voter and the authority. Its main function
is to publish relevant information, especially the pre- and post-election tables.
2.1.1 The procedure The work is split into three parts: things that need to be done before,
during and after the election.
Before the election the authority needs to compose a list of valid voters. The total number
of voters must be published in order to be sure that no voters are added or deleted during the
procedure. Furthermore the authority chooses a unique identifier Election ID for the election.
In addition for each of the candidates the authority generates a unique id called Candidate ID.
All of these ids need to be published.
The authority1 generates a unique DES key Kvoter for each voter and distributes it to the
voter’s smartcard. On multi-function cards this loading can typically be done safely after issuing
without the need for secure channels. With this secret key and the Election ID the authority
calculates the so-called Voter ID:
Voter ID := MDC(MACKvoter
(Election ID)) (1)
Here MDC stands for Modification Detection Code, which is a public hash or one-way function.2
In other words the MDC(x) is easy to compute once given x, but there is no way to derive the
value x itself given MDC(x). MDC is used by Robers because this function is a standard function
on the IBM multi-function cards used. It can of course be replaced by any other reliable key-
less hash function. Furthermore, MAC stand for Message Authentication Code. This is also a
hash function, but based upon the secret key Kvoter. In particular this means that wherever
MACKvoter
(x) appears, this must have been calculated in a place where Kvoter is known.
Using all these ids, the authority now computes a ballot collection for each voter. Each collection
looks like this: 

Voter ID
MDC(MACKvoter
(Candidate ID1))
MDC(MACKvoter
(Candidate ID2))
...
MDC(MACKvoter
(Candidate IDN ))


(2)
Note that Kvoter only leaves the crypto-hardware on the smartcard sent to the voters. The
authority itself has no access to Kvoter. The crypto-hardware should delete these voter keys after
distribution.
After sending these ballot collections to the anonymizer, encrypted with a special key Kanon,
the authority has finished all its tasks, even though the election itself has not started yet.
Now we discuss what the anonymizer has to do. It starts by decrypting all the ballot collections
it received from the authority. Next it sorts these collections upon the Voter ID. This guarantees
that there is no link between the order of the collections and the identity of the voters. Finally,
it publishes the sorted list of ballot collections. We refer to this list as the pre-election table. It
makes it possible to link MDC(MACKvoteri
(Candidate IDj)) to candidate j.
During the election the anonymizer receives the votes from the voters. These are encrypted
with the anonymizer’s public key Khide,public and hence the anonymizer uses the corresponding
private key Khide,secret to decrypt them. The anonymizer acknowledges this reception by writing
some value in each voter’s smartcard.
After the election the anonymizer publishes a list of all received ballots. We refer to this list
as the post-election table.
The third party involved is the voter. During the election he has to use his smartcard to
compute his own Voter ID, based upon the Election ID, exactly as the authority already did
in (1). Since this requires Kvoter only he can do this. Furthermore he identifies the Candidate ID
of the candidate of his choice. Then he computes his vote
MACKvoter
(Candidate ID) (3)
If he wants to check his result he should also compute the value
MDC(MACKvoter
(Candidate ID)) (4)
1 Technically, this can also be done by a different party as long as it is a party that uses crypto-hardware.
Note that this must be done in an unpredictable way.
2 To be precise RIES uses the MDC 2 algorithm.
which he compares with the values listed in the published ballot collections at the anonymizer. He
now knows whether his vote will be interpreted correctly. He sends his vote to the anonymizer:(
Voter ID
MACKvoter
(Candidate ID)
)
(5)
The first part of this vote is used to check the authenticity of the voter in an anonymous way. The
second part is used to determine the chosen candidate. To ensure that this vote is not recorded
during transmission he encrypts his vote with the anonymizer’s public key Khide,public before
sending it to the anonymizer. The complete setup of the system is shown in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. This diagram is an exact copy of [4, Figure 1.3].
After the election the outcome can be calculated by everyone without using any secret keys.
All one needs to do is compute MDC(Voter ID) and MDC(MACKvoter
(Candidate ID)) for all
the received votes published by the anonymizer in the post-election table. Note that this actually
only requires the computation of the outer MDC hash values. These hashes can then be looked
up in the pre-election table. In this way one can determine for which candidate each vote should
count. This transparency and verifiability make the whole approach very attractive.
2.2 RIES
As mentioned earlier, Robers did his research under supervision of Maclaine Pont. And because
the system was not patented in 1998 but published as [4], it could be used as a starting point for
RIES. However there are some major differences:
– Because of the cost aspect it was out of the question to give each potential voter a multi-
function smartcard. Therefore RIES uses a different system for key management and authen-
tication.
– Robers’s system is a purely electronic voting system. RIES is not, since it also provides the
possibility to vote by regular mail.
– The strict distinction between the parties authority, anonymizer and voter indicated by Robers
is not all that clear for RIES.
These three points will be discussed in more detail below.
2.2.1 Smartcard replacement Because of the high cost it was no option in the water man-
agement elections to give each potential voter a personal smartcard. Therefore Robers’s system
had to be adapted. In his system the smartcard is used for two purposes: to hold the secret keys
and to perform computation of the MDC and MAC.
Distribution of the secret key within RIES is done by printing it on paper and sending this
paper by ordinary mail to the voter. The key is printed in sixteen digits of the so-called AN34
format. This is a regular number system just like the decimal or hexadecimal system, but now the
base is 34. Its digits are the ciphers 0,. . . ,9 and the characters a,. . . ,k,m,n,p,. . . ,z. The ‘l’ and ‘o’
are not used because their appearance is too similar to ‘1’ and ‘0’. Using a high base like 34 means
that one can store higher values in fewer digits. And fewer digits printed on the card means that
it will be easier for the voter to enter the digits on his computer.
Obviously, since the secret key is simply printed on paper, the voter must be careful with the
paper. No-one else should be able to copy or memorize the sixteen digits on his ballot. Hence after
voting he should make sure that the key is destroyed.
The cryptographic computations that the smartcard would have performed are now done by
the client’s computer using JavaScript. If a voter wants to vote, his browser connects to a webserver
and downloads a page that contains JavaScript. Within these scripts there are routines available to
compute the MDC and MAC values. Of course letting the client’s computer do these computations
implies a certain risk: the JavaScript code can easily be modified in order to send arbitrary data
to the server trying to impersonate legitimate voters. However, in order to cast a valid vote, a
client’s computer should either be lucky enough to guess both a valid Voter ID as well as a valid
MACKvoter
(Candidate ID) or it must operate as a virus and read the secret key from the voter
as he enters it. The first situation is quite unlikely and the second situation can be detected if the
voter checks his vote afterwards.3
2.2.2 Integration with mail voting system The merging of the electronic votes and the
ordinary mail votes comes down to a transformation of the latter ones to the so-called technical
votes already used by the electronic votes. On each paper ballot there are some special numbers
from which the Voter ID and the MACKvoter
(Candidate ID) can be computed. The algorithm
used for this has not been made public, but obviously the Kvoter needs to be in those numbers
somehow. Hence after this transformation the mail votes are handled the same way as internet
votes.
Because the mail voters are not getting any feedback on this transformation to a technical
vote, they are not able to check what has been done with their vote. Only in case they cast both
electronically as well as by mail they can use the electronic feedback to see what happened with
their paper vote. However, in the previous election which was done entirely by ordinary mail, it
was also not possible for the voter to check his vote, hence this drawback does not make the system
any worse than the previous one.
2.2.3 Roles within RIES Whereas Robers emphasizes a clear distinction between who does
what, such compartmentalization is not so clear in the RIES system. Main party in the actual
elections in the fall of 2004 is a company called TTPI which consists of the architect of RIES,
Maclaine Pont, and the main developer Arnout Hannink. For instance they take care of creating
the secret keys, publishing the reference tables, merging the mail votes with the internet votes and
computing the final outcome. In particular this means that this TTPI company knows all the ins
and outs of the system, including the secret keys.
Other parties involved in RIES are the board of Rijnland, SURFnet and of course the potential
voters.
3 There are also other alternatives to protect against such viruses such as using candidate-identities that
are different for each voter, so that the virus does not know which identity to select. But this is not
part of RIES.
2.2.4 The details Because the separation in roles is not as clear as in the original system by
Robers, we will describe the RIES details by looking at the different phases of the procedure:
before, during and after the voting.
Before the voting Most of the work before the actual voting takes place is done by TTPI. It starts
by generating a DES key Ki for each voter i. These keys are printed on the ballots. As mentioned
before they are represented on the ballots in AN34 format. Furthermore TTPI uses these keys
to generate the same ballot collections we have seen in (2) in Robers’s system. By combining all
these ballot collections the so-called reference table or pre-election table is created. This table is
published on the internet in the form of a two level .zip file. See Figure 2 for an example. In
principle it shouldn’t matter whether these reference tables are presented as .zip files or just as a
huge .txt file. However, we have noticed a small problem with the use of .zip files in combination
with the MD5 hashes, which are used to prove that files are not modified. We will get back to this
in Section 4.
Archive: 01010204.zip
Length Date Time Name
-------- ---- ---- ----
2172 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT_0.zip
4017 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT_1.zip
2173 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT_2.zip
1865 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT_3.zip
2789 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT_4.zip
3097 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT_5.zip
2787 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT_6.zip
1559 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT_7.zip
1559 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT_8.zip
2480 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT_9.zip
2784 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT_A.zip
3405 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT_B.zip
2785 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT_C.zip
1867 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT_D.zip
1559 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT_E.zip
3403 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT_F.zip
0 08-25-04 08:51 01010204/
-------- -------
40301 17 files
Archive: RT_0.zip
Length Date Time Name
-------- ---- ---- ----
220 08-25-04 09:31 008AB1E98AEDFBA450A1813DDC153553
220 08-25-04 09:31 08677B73378E1D59153DE30263A3C47C
220 08-25-04 09:31 06CAC042AF7D6940DD8A51814E68DFF8
220 08-25-04 09:31 00FEA51461FBF7B406554EEF2E23554D
220 08-25-04 09:31 05C02BD8E3863DB24D6C332A17B78EFB
220 08-25-04 09:32 070C60BFFC06B7355425E6FFADBBED30
220 08-25-04 09:32 034C37BA687E21477D38A110954207B8
-------- -------
1540 7 files
008AB1E98AEDFBA450A1813DDC153553:
vervangend=0
verstrekt=1
vervallen=0
AC94983743058334B25452E0F63A9C20=0101020401
B0015BAC8ECF766DB67825592DC10957=0101020402
ACE42133255CA8184D18E0293FEF7EE8=0101020403
358AAB0C934757ACCF071A1CD732EDEA=0101020499
Fig. 2. Reference table format. On the left we see the first level within 01010204.zip. On the
top right we see the second level: all hashed Voter IDs starting with 0 are archived into
RT 0.zip. On the bottom right we see the ballot collection for the voter with MDC(Voter ID) =
008AB1E98AEDFBA450A1813DDC153553. It contains three lines with status bits indicating whether
the ballot is a replacement, used or revoked. Because this particular election only had three real candidates
(0101020401, 0101020402, 0101020403) and one blank (0101020499) there are only four entries found after
the status bits.
After publication of these reference tables together with their MD5 hashes, TTPI no longer
needs the keys and destroys them. Checking that this actually happens is a procedural matter.
See Figure 3.
During the voting During the actual voting two parties are active. The vote server which is
operated by SURFnet, the national internet service provider for universities in the Netherlands,
and of course the voter.
Voter i copies the codes printed on his ballot into the appropriate fields of the web page
internetstemmen.nl. In particular this means that he hands over his personal key Ki to the
JavaScript engine of his browser. If he managed to do this without mistakes he can click on his
favorite candidate j. The JavaScript engine in his browser will compute the so-called technical
vote which consists of two values: his Voter ID which is equal to MACKi(Election ID) and
MACKi(Candidate IDj). Exactly the two values we have already seen before in (5). This vote
is sent to the vote server through SSL, and hence it is encrypted and cannot be revealed by other
parties besides the voter and the vote server. Note in particular that the secret key Ki is not sent
over the internet!
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Fig. 3. Phase 1: before the voting
If the server receives this encrypted vote, it decrypts it and strips all meta information like
time, date and network address from the vote before storing it. It computes a receipt confirmation
and sends this back to the voter. After receiving this confirmation, the voter should carefully
destroy his ballot with his secret key. Furthermore he should store his technical vote (5) in order
to perform a check afterwards. See Figure 4.
After the voting After the elections are closed, three parties come into action. First, SURFnet
hands over all collected technical votes to TTPI. TTPI starts by computing an MD5 hash over
these files in order to prove that they did not modify the votes from the server.4 Next, TTPI
computes the total outcome and the official voting office publishes it.
Before TTPI starts working on the technical votes given to them by SURFnet, they transform
the scanned paper ballots into technical votes and add them to the files received from SURFnet.
From this point on they are treated as internet votes as well. Hence if we talk about technical
votes they can originate either from an internet vote or from a mail vote.
TTPI computes the outcome of the election by computing for each technical vote the MDC
hash on both parts. In order for a vote to be valid, the combination of these hashes needs to
be somewhere in the reference table. Votes that do not comply with this rule are automatically
marked as invalid. Furthermore, if the hashes do represent a real vote, TTPI checks whether the
vote might be invalid because of some other reason. E.g. if one voter has cast votes for different
candidates. If a vote is declared invalid, a log entry is created indicating why it was invalid and
hence not counted. A later check can then show what happened with a particular vote. After
filtering out all invalid votes, the valid votes that appear more than once are also reduced to one
occurrence. Finally, the actual counting is done by looking up the hashes in the reference table
and appoint the correct number of votes to the indicated candidates. See Figure 5.
4 We think that it would have been more trustworthy if SURFnet computed this hash before handing the
files over to TTPI.
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3 Results verified
We have stated in the introduction already that one of the distinguishing features of RIES is that
it is transparent. Each voter can check what has happened to his personal vote and anyone who
is interested can verify the tally process. In particular this means that also people who were not
allowed to vote can check the results.
3.1 Voter specific check
A voter can check his vote because he sees his technical vote on his screen during voting. If he
saves this information he will later be able to search for his vote in the post-election table. In
this list next to his technical vote also the MDC hashes of the two parts of this vote are listed.
With those values he can check in the reference table that his vote was indeed given to his favorite
candidate. In the current implementation, there is a drawback to this check system. It is completely
based upon the service provided by TTPI: they have already computed the hashes! So if a voter
wants to be really sure TTPI did not mess with his vote, he will have to compute the hashes
himself. Fortunately there are programs available that can do this. For instance recent versions
of openssl can compute this MDC hash. But the voter can also implement this function in his
favorite programming language. In the JavaScript he already downloaded in order to vote, he can
find a JavaScript implementation of this function which can be used as an example. Alternatively,
third parties might offer this verification service.
Note that the fact that this transparency feature also introduces a potential privacy problem:
anyone able to find your stored technical vote will be able to determine which candidate you voted
for.
3.2 General outcome check
The outsider tally verification is also based upon the fact that the computation of the MDC hash
can be done by anyone. The authors have written a Java program that uses the files available for
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Fig. 5. Phase 3: After the voting
download at the website to compute the final result. Though conceptually easy, we encountered
some problems while writing this program.
First of all there is a problem with the files to start with. Theoretically we should start with
the files handed over by SURFnet. They are available for download, but the problem is that these
files do not include the technical votes that are transformed from the votes sent in by ordinary
mail. Therefore we were forced to start with the file created by TTPI which already contains all
the status bits on validity checks. Hence this means that our tally still depends a bit on TTPI’s
work, which is something we don’t want. Fortunately, we can check that this TTPI file has a
one-to-one correspondence to the SURFnet file when it comes to electronic votes. So at least we
know for sure that all internet votes have been counted correctly. Since there is no way that we
can check the validity of the imported ordinary mail votes, we always have to trust TTPI on this
part. Note that if RIES would have been used in a purely electronic voting session, this would not
have been a problem and the system could have been checked completely independent of TTPI.
The second problem we encountered was in the rules determining whether a vote is valid or
not. On implementing the rules presented by the RIES project team, we had to make some choices
on the order of performing the different validity tests. Obviously, for the outcome of the tally it is
not important to know why a specific vote has been declared invalid. The only thing important is
that the same set of votes is declared illegal in the different tally programs. However, the choices
we made incidentally happened to declare votes invalid for exactly the same reason as the original
tally software from TTPI. And hence the outcome of our tally was exactly the same as TTPI’s
outcome, which was used as official outcome of the elections.
4 Critical remarks
Both Robers’s system and RIES present a practical way to set up safe internet elections. Safe
in the sense that it is possible to detect fraud. As we have seen in Section 3 internet voters can
check what happens to their own vote. We would like to stress that it is important that voters
indeed use this possibility. Unfortunately, voters have complained that in the actual use of the
RIES system the procedure to check their vote is quite complicated, hence reducing the chance
that these checks will really be carried out.
Some critical remarks are appropriate, however. They can contribute to an even better system.
– The current, mixed system is not completely transparent because of the parallel election by
ordinary mail. People who voted by mail do not really have the opportunity to check what
happens to their vote. In particular TTPI, the party that merges mail votes with internet
votes, should really be trusted. In principle they have the possibility to tamper with the mail
votes. This can only be prevented by procedural checks.
– Since TTPI knows everything about the system it has a lot and maybe too much power. Not
because we have reason to believe that they abuse their powers, but mainly because in general
a separation of powers, compartmentalization, is wise, we would like to see that other parties
take over some of their responsibilities.
– In Figure 2 we have seen that the ballot collection for each voter also contains three status bits.
These bits indicate whether the corresponding vote ballot is actually being used or revoked and
so on. When these reference tables are published before the elections, the MD5 hash over the
.zip files are computed. However, if a voter complains that he did not receive a ballot, he can
ask for a replacement. This means that the status bits for his first ballot will change from used
to revoked and the status bits for his second ballot will change from replacement to used. For
the tally process it is essential that these changes are recorded. Otherwise it would be possible
to cast valid votes with revoked ballots! Therefore the reference tables need to be modified
after the election. Obviously, since the status bits are within the files itself such a modification
will cause the MD5 hash of the complete .zip file to change as well. The problem here is that
the hashes are meant to detect whether the MDC hashes inside the files are modified or not.
Hence by looking at the hashes only it is not possible to determine whether a reference table
.zip was modified only in its status bits or also in its content. In order to verify whether
the content has not been changed one really needs to go into the files and compare each
ballot collection in the modified tables to the corresponding collection in the original tables.
The authors tried to automate such a check for the Rijnland election using a ‘diff’ tool. In
principle the check worked, but we did not foresee that the order of the MDC hashes in the
files could have changed as well. Therefore our script reported a lot of false positives: diff
reported permutations of the rows as modifications whereas these modifications are harmless
with respect to the RIES system. Adding a simple sort into the script would solve this problem,
but because of the fact that we were roughly talking about 200 million files to check, we did
not run the script again. We manually inspected a random set of them and found that they
were all indeed false positives.
As a side effect our script showed that the total number of status bit combinations in the .zip
files was exactly as published by TTPI.
– Using hashes in combination with .zip files can also lead to false positives for other reasons.
For instance it should be possible to build up the modified reference tables by starting with
the old ones, unzipping them and applying the changes as recorded by the voting office while
handing out new ballots. After zipping the new tables it would be nice if a check on the MD5
hashes showed that this construction indeed leads to the same tables published by TTPI.
However, due to different zip programs it is possible that files which are equal when unzipped
will not be equal if zipped. Hence such a check is likely to fail whereas it should not.
– The system depends on collision free hashes. If two valid candidates or voters are mapped onto
the same hash value, it is no longer possible to determine which candidate was the chosen
one. However, since these collisions can already be noted by the authority after generating
the reference tables, it seems that the authority should be able to replace the keys for the
particular voter causing the collision. However, with a good hash function such collisions are
extremely rare.
– Besides TTPI also SURFnet needs to be trusted. Since they are able to compute the MDC
hashes on each vote they received, they can detect for which candidate each vote is intended.
And in particular this means that they can delete votes for candidates they don’t like. Since
the MD5 hash on their received votes will only be computed when the election has been closed
and the votes are handed over to TTPI, it is difficult to detect such fraud. An independent
party cannot detect it for instance. Only if each internet voter checks his own vote, he can
detect this kind of fraud with his vote.
– Note that it is not possible for SURFnet to add valid votes: they need the secret keys for that.
However, since TTPI is calculating the MD5 hash to secure the post-election table, and they
had the secret keys before the election, they are in a position to alter or add votes in favor of
specific candidates. Note that they can only do this if they offended the policy to destroy the
keys after distributing them! Fortunately SURFnet can detect fraud like this. As long as they
do not destroy the files with the received votes before TTPI publishes their list, SURFnet can
detect any modification with respect to the internet votes.
– The concept known as ‘family voting’ is always a risk in internet elections. However in this
particular RIES setting, it is accepted as a risk, like it already was in the previous election
which was done entirely by ordinary mail.
– In general it is good to have open source software for electronic voting systems. Because of the
JavaScript used in the RIES system, most of the code is automatically open source. Currently
the code running on the server that collects the votes and the tally software is not open source.
However, because of the transparency of the system, this is less important. It does not really
matter what this software does as long as the final outcome is correct. And this is something
that can be checked independently.
– DDOS remains a concern, but has not turned out to be a problem in the actual elections.
SURFnet has taken technical measures to handle heavy traffic.
5 Conclusion
This paper has presented a critical account of the actual use of a little known internet voting
system RIES. The system itself is very interesting because its verifiability: fraud can be detected.
Independent recounts have indeed taken place—leading to the same outcome as the official one.
The procedural issues surrounding the organization of the elections based on RIES leave room for
improvement. Especially the merging of the ordinary mail votes with the internet votes needs to
become more verifiable. The designers have already announced the intention to implement such a
verification system. Hence the RIES system gives us a more positive feeling towards the future of
internet voting than the authors of [3].
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